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Employment Trends and Contemporary Immigration Policy:
The Macro Implications
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Cornell University
Over its national history, there have been few influences more important to
the development of the population and the labor force of the United states than
immigration. The descriptive phrase "a nation of immigrants" correctly portrays
both the quantitative magnitude of the numbers of people who have come as well
as the qualitative characteristics of their skill and educational contributions
to the process of nation building. The fact that the United States continues to
receive substantial inflows of immigra.nts remains a distinguishing feature of
the nation from the practices of virtually all other countries. Throughout the
19705 and extending into the early 1980s, the United States has legally sdrnitted
twice as many immigrants and refugees for permanent settlement as the remaining
nations of the world combined. If an allowance is made for the number of
,'.
illegal immigrants who entered and settled over this sa~e period, gap is even
more pronounced.
There are only two ways for a nation to acquire its labor force: people
are born within its boundaries or they immigrate from other nations. Throughout
most of the 19th Century and the early 20th Century, immigration was perhaps the
most important aspect of the nation's human resource policy. The imposition of
the nation's first nUTIerical ceilings on immigration in the 1920s were follOl\'ed
by several decades of depression, war, and their respective aftermaths. As a
consequence, immigration receded significantly in terms of its human resource
importance fra7. the mid-1920s to the mid-1960s. Because of this diminished role
over that 40 year period, many scholars ~nd policymakers have been slow lo
2recognize that since the mid-1960s, immigration -- in all of its diverse forms
-- has again become a major feature of the U.S. economy. During 1980, for
example, it is believed that more foreign-born people came to the United States
for permanent settlement than in any previous year in the nation's history.
Moreover, the 1980 Census revealed that since 1970 lithe number of foreign born
Americans has increased sharply after declining [each decade] since 1920 and
[that] one of every 10 people reported speaking a language other than English at
home."1 Noting the emerging trends, leon Bouvier observed in 1981 that "im-
migration now appears to be almost as important as fertility insofar as U.S.
population growth is concerned."Z As the labor force is the principal means by
which population changes are transmitted to the nation's economy, Bouvier warned
that "there is a compelling argument for close coordination between the formu-
lation of employment and immigration pOlicy."3 It is precisely to this point
that the content of this paper is addressed.
The Data Dilemma
Although it is a subject for discussion itself, it is necessary to mention
briefly that a persistent barrier to the study of the effects of immigration an
the labor force is the gross deficiency of available data. Part 0 f the ex-
planation for this inadequacy can no doubt be attributed to the decline in the
relative importance of immigration to the nation from the mid-1920s to the
mid-1960s. Even since 1965, a myriad of other domestic human resource issues --
such as concerns over youth unemployment, shortages of scientific and technical
manpower, minority employment patterns, the job dislocation effects of changing
technology, women in the labor market, anti-poverty concerns, and regional
employment shifts -- have diverted attention from the gradual re-emergence of
immigration as a major concern.4 As a result, there has been little pressure
from scholars and policymakers for better collection and dissemination of
3immigratIon data despite major improvements in most other labor force data
sources over this same time interval. The influences of immigration on the
labor market are without doubt the weakest links in the nation's contemporary
labor market statistics system.5
As a consequence, a recent congressional report on immigration concluded
that despite "long established data collection programs, immigration related
data are still deficient in scope, quality, and availability" and that "immi-
gration statistics are particularly inadequate as tools for policy analysis and
demographic research."6 Reliable information on the economic character-
istics of legal immigrants and refugees is scant and for illegal immigrants
essentially nonexistant. Likewise, data on emigration flows out of the country
have not been collected since 1958. Hence, net immigration cannot even be
approximated with any degree of accuracy.
The lack of reliable data has been consistently used by persons and groups
who oppose policy initiatives to reform the nation's inadequate immigration
system. Yet, lest one dispares too much, this problem must be put into proper
perspective. Gross data deficiencies are not unique to the study of immi-
gration. The lack of reliable and useful data plagues virtually every important
area of public policy. Yet the lack of good data has in no way retarded the
initiation of significant policy interventions in these other areas of public
concern. It is only with respect to immigration reform that the argument has
been effectively used to forestall reform efforts.
The Ability of Policy to Affect labor Force Trends
The preponderance of labor force trends that occur within the economy are
beyond the realm of policymakers to influence even if they want to do so. labor
market research has repeatedly shown, for instance, that race and gender can
influence employment and income experiences. As the number and proportion of
4minorities and women have increased in the labor force, there is nothing that
human resources policymak~rs can do to change these trends. They can only
respond with adjustment policies to reduce the influence of the factors that
cause these outcome differentials to occur. The same can be said for dem-
ographic changes in the .age distribution of the labor force; or the shift in
social values that have contributed to the dramatic increase in female
labor force participation; or the effects of the pace and scope of technological
change on the preparation of workers for jobs. The control of immigration flow,
however, is considered to be an exercise in the use of the discretionary powers
of the state. As such it is one dimension of."a nation's human resource policy
that should be capable of directive action rather than forced reaction.
Immigration has economic implications for the participants and for the
receiving society. It can determine labor force trends as well as respond to
them. For this reason, the efficacy 0 f policies that regulate immigration must
be judged in terms of how they related to broader labor force trends at any
prevailing time. As will soon be apparent, this is decidedly not the case in
the United States at the present time.
The Influence of Administrative Structure
Because the magnitude and composition of immigration flows are supposedly
subject to direct regulation by human institutions, it is important to under-
stand how the policy making pr?cess functions. Although there is only scant
mention of immigration in the Constitution, by the late Nineteenth Century the
Supreme Court had concluded that the federal government was the exclusive
governmental body to exercise this authority.7 After a brief assignment of
administrative power to several different agencies, the responsibility for
immigration policy was ultimately shifted lo the newly established U.S. Depart-
. .
ment of labor (DOL) in 1914. This action represented a clear recognition by
5policymakers of the time that labor market considerations should be a primary
concern in the administra~ion of immigration policy. In 1933, by executive
order, the immigration and the naturalization functions were joined into one
body -- the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in DOL.
With the recognitio~ in 1940 of the likely involvement of the United States
in World War II, a critical decision was made that has had lasting influence on
the course of immigration policy. Namely in June, 1940, the INS was shifted
from DOL to the U.S. Department of Justice. Ostensibly, the shift was necessary
for national security reasons. It was believed that rapidly changing inter-
national events dictated a more effective means of control over immigrants and
non-immigrants. Concern over the entry or presence of subversive elements in
the population was elevated to the highest priority of the agency. labor
market considerations -- the historic concern -- were shunted aside. ~~en the
war ended, the agency remained in the Department of Justice. The long run
effects of this change have been disastrous to efforts to build a coherent
immigration policy -- especially if one of the concerns is that immigration
policy should be co~gruent with domestic labor force trends. The Department of
Justice has multiple responsibilities and, when compared to its numerous other
important duties, immigration matters have tended to be neglected or relegated
to a low order of priority. Moreover, the Department of Justice is one of the
most politically se~sitive ag~ncies in the federal government. It has often
opted for short run expedient solutions for immigration issues. It has seldom
manifested any interest in the economic aspects and consequences of immigration.
Another lasting effect of the shift of immigration'policy to the Justice
Department has been that the two judiciary committees of Congress gained the
responsibility for supervision over immigration in general and the INS in
particular. Traditionally, membership on these committees has been reserved
6(often exclusiv'ely) for lawyers. The result, as noted by David North and Allen
leBel, is that "as immigration problems arise, be they major or minor, perceived
or real, the response of lawyer-legislators is that the law should be
changed."e As a consequence, immigration law in the United States has become
extremely complex and legalistic. Over the years, the labor market implications
of immigration policy have either been ignored or, in the best of circumstances,
been given superficial attention.
Immigration Trends Since 1965
The revival of legal immigration as an influential force can be virtually
dated to the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965. It represented the cul-
mination of decades of efforts to purge the nation's immigration system of the
overt racism that had been the central focus of the "national origins system"
that was adopted in 1924. After years of active struggle, the Civil Rights
movement achieved its capstone goal -- the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Consequently, just as overt racism could no longer be tolerated in the
way citizens were treated by fellow citizens, neither could racism be practiced
by the laws that govern the way in which non-citizens were considered for
immigrant admission status.
The restrictive features of the "national origins system" had done more
than shape the racial and ethnic composition of immigrant flows. They had
sharply distorted the total flow of immigrants. Some nations with large quotas
(e.g., Great Britain which was entitled to about 40 percent of all of the
available visas) did not use all of the slots available to it while other
nations (e.g., Italy and Greece) with small quotas had backlogs of ~uuld-be
immigrants who were prevented from entering. Hence, during the years 1952 to
1965, for example, only 61 percent of the available quotas were actually used
7despite the fact that tens of thousands of persons were precluded from
admission over this period because they came from the "wrong" country. Suc-
ceeding administrations in the post-World War II era were forced, therefore, to
seek ad hoc legislation and to use parole powers given to the Attorney
General to admit hundreds of thousands of refugees for both humanitarian and
national interest considerations. As a consequence, one of every three
persons admitted to the United States from 1952 to 1965 entered outside the
terms of the prevailing immigration system. Hence, because the system was
outdated by the progression of both world and domestic events, the Immigration
Act of 1965 was adopted.
It is important to note that while the changes enacted in 1965 signi-
ficantly changed the character of the existing system, the reform movement cuuld
not entirely escape the heavy hand of the past. Thus, while overt racism was
eliminated in 1965, the new act elevated family reunification to the role of
being the dominant factor to determine the preferences for immigrant admission.
On the surface this might seem to be a humane feature but the motivation for the
change was far for less noble. The change was made in the judiciary committel~ of
the House of Representatives where some congressional supporters were more
concerned with finding a way to retain the older national origins system under a
covert guise. Obviously, if certain groups had been excluded or had a low quota
in the past they would have had fewer chances to hav~ relatives \~o could us~
their presence as a means to admit new immigrants. Thus, reliance on family
unification would largely benefit those groups who had large quotas under the
older system. Even though the Johnson Administration had sought to retain both
lhe priority and the emphasis of labor market considerations as the highest
preference criterion (which had been the case since the use of a preference
system to determine immigrant pr iorities was formally established in 1952),
8Congress made family reunification the dominant admission factor. Labor markel
considerations were downgraded to both lower preferences and to a reduced number
of visa allotments. The ostensible reason for the reversal or priorities was
that, during the era when labor market factors dominated the admission criteria,
the system did not use all of the available slots. But as already noted, the
reason for the inability to use all of the available slots between 1952-65 was
the distortion imposed by the "national origins system" -- not the concept of
labor force priority itself.
In the years since 1965, there have been a number of minor changes in the
immigration system but they have retained this focus on family reunification.
The system as of early 1984 sets a single world wide admission ceiling of
270,000 visas to be issued each year. No more than 20,000 visas are to be
allotted to the would-be immigrants of anyone country. The "immediate
relatives" of each visa holder, however, are not counted in either ceiling.
Immediate relatives are spouses, children, and parents of U.S. citizens over age
21. To decide which speci fie individuals are to be granted such a visa within
the framework of these numerical ceilings, a six category preference system
exists. The categories rank the preferences in order with a certain proportion
of the total visas reserved for each preference. Four of the preference
categories (which account for 80 percent of the visas) are reserved for persons
who are family rp.laled. Two of the categories (ranked 3rd and 6th) are based on
labor market principles. For these two categories, a person must secure a labor
market certification from the Department of Labor that states that the presence
of the immigrant will not adversely effect the job opportunities and prevailing
labor force standards of citizen workers. In addition to these considerations,
Congress has established 33 separate classes of people whQ are specifically
excluded from being admitted (e.g., paupers, prostitutes, Nazis, communists,
9fascists, homosexuals, etc.) no matter if they would otherwise be eligible to be
an immigrant or a refugee..
It should also be noted that between 1965 and 1980, a separate preference
group existed for refugees with 17,400 slots. Over that interval, however, the
actual number of refugee admissions greatly exceeded this ceiling (averaging
about 50,000 persons a year). The excesses were admitted through the use of the
parole authority given to the Attorney General to admit persons for emergent
reasons. Because the use of the parole powers was finally admitted to be what it
was -- a means of circumventing the existing immigration statutes, refugees were
removed from the established immigration system in 1980. With the Refugee Act
of 1980, refugees are now admitted under an entirely new procedure. Since 1982,
the President sutmits a number of refugees to be admitted in advance of the n~xt
fiscal year to Congress where a consultation process takes place. The number 0 f
refugees approved for 1984, for instance, is 72,000 persons.
The Refugee Act of 1980 also created an asylee policy for the United States
for the first time. As opposed to a refugee (who is usually a person living
outside of his 01' her home nation and who fear3 persecution if forced to ret.urn
but who is not presently in the United States), an asylee is a person who also
fears similar persecution if he or she returns to his or her homeland but is
already physically present in the United States. The Refugee Act of 1980
authorized up to 5,000 asylee admissions a year. As of early 1984, there were
over 173,000 asylee requests pending approval and it is likely that this number
will continue to grow.
Having discussed the "front door" approaches to the nations labor market,
it is necessary to add that there is a massive "back door" approach as well.
This method, of course, is through the process of illegal immigration. for
10
although the legal system is extremely complex in its objectives, the entire
system can be easily circumvented due the absence of a system of effective
deterrence of those persons who simply enter on their volition. All evidence
indicates that most illegal i~nigrants come to the United states to find jobs --
not for purposes of securing welfare or for criminal purposes. No one, of
course, knows the exact number of illegal immigrants who compose the stock of
the illegal immigrant population or the annual flow. In its final report in
1981, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy cited a range of
from 3.5 to 6 million illegal immigrants who were believed to be in the United
States. Their estimate, however, was based upon a review by the Census Bureau
of a variety of previous studies done in the early and mid-1970s. When making
this estimate, the Bureau concluded "we have, unfortunately, been unable to
arrive at definite estimates of the number of illegal residents in the United
States or the magnitude of the illegal immigrant flow". 9 Thus, whatever the
validity of the estimates provided by the Bureau and included in the Select
Commission report, it should be understood that those estimates are based on the
averaging of data for the mid-1970s -- not the mid-1980s. Hence, given the
certainty that illegal immigration has increased since the mid-1970s, the stock
and flows are no doubt greater now than those cited by the Commission's Report.
Unfortunately, the only data series on illegal immigrants that is con-
sistently available is the administrative data on apprehensions collected by the
INS. This series, shown in Table 1 for the years 1965 to 1983, indicates a
consistent upward trend. The problem with this data, of course, is that it
cannot correct Usel f for multiple captures of the same indiv idual in anyone
year. Yet there is no reason to believe that the multiple entry problem is
proportionately any more substantial in the 1980s than it was in the 1960s.
Hence, this series is probably reliable as a general indicator of the trend
11
Table 1. Illegal Immigrants Apprehended,
1965-1983
Period
Number of Apprehended
III ega 1 101migrants
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
.1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
110,371
138,520
161,608
212,057
283,557
345,353
420,126
505,949
655,968
788,145
756,819
866,433
1,033,427
1,047,687
1,069,400
910,361
975,780
962,687
1,248,000
Soul'ce: U.S. Departm'?llt of Justice, Annual Reports of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.
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toward larger numbers of illegal immigrants in the U.S. labor force. Somewhat
reluctantly, the General Accounting Office, in its exhaustive review in 1982 of
the literature on the size of the illegal immigrant population came to the
conclusion that, despite its limitations, the apprehension statistics are "the
most comprehensive data on illegal aliens" that are available.10 It should be
noted, of course, that this series only counts those that are caught. It is
widely believed that apprehensions are only the tip of the iceberg.
lastly, with respect to immigration policy and the labor force, there is
the subject of non-immigrant workers. for a number of legitimate reasons,
permission is given to a number of non-citizen workers (about 360,000 persons)
to be employed in the United States. Some of these are foreign ambassadors, the
foreign news media, visiting professors, athletes, rock bands as well as a wide
assortment of other classifications. In most of these instances, there is
little concern over any possible labor force displacement effects. There is,
however, one category of foreign workers in this grouping that has been a
consistent source of debate over the legitimacy of their need and over their
possible displac~aent effects. These are H-2workers who are admitted on a
temporary basis. Of the approximately 23,000 admitted annually in recent years,
about one-half are admitted as agricultural workers. The number of H-2 workers,
however, is not specified by law so the number can fluctuate depending upon
employer demand a,ld the will ingness 0 f the Department a f labor (and samet imes
the Attorney General ~10 can override denial of a request by the Department of
labor) to admit them.
labor Market Imoacts of the Era of Renewed Immiqration
There is a paucity of credible research on the precise employment exper-
iences of all groups of post-1965 immigrants. There is no ~tatistical data base
to mensure the labor force status of immigrants comparable to the informal ion
13
.
compiled by the monthly Current Population Survey conducted by the U.S. Census
Bureau for all workers in the United States. Hence, there does not exist any
published data series that indicates employment, unemployment, or labor force
participation for immigrants. All that are available are administrative
statistics as well as the findings of a few ad hoc studies that have been
--
conducted over the past decade. From these disparate sources however, it is
possible to discern some likely tendencies as well as some firm conclusions. An
awareness of these tendencies and conclusions is an essential prerequisite to an
understanding the macro-economic effects of immigration to the nation.
The Immigrant Infusion to the Supply of labor Has Increased
The annual flow of legal immigrants since 1965 has more than doubled the
annual flow that existed for the period 1924 to 1965. For the earlier period,
the annual flow was 191,000 immigrants and immediate relatives a year; for the
period 1965 to 1981, the number has increased to an annual average of 435,000;
for the years 1978 to 1981, it was 547,000. These figures do not include those
refugees who have yet to adjust their status to become resident aliens, or those
asylees whose status is still pending, or any illegal immigrants. If all flows
are considered, it is likely that immigration in .the 1980s is accounting for as
much as half of the annual growth in the population and probably an even greater
percentage of the real growth of the labor force.11
The Size of the Annual Flow of. Immiqrants Has NG Regard for Domestic Labor
Market Conditions
The aggregate nlETlber of immigrants and immediate relatives admitted each
year is completely independent of the prevailing labor .market conditions. The
number of immigrants annually admitted has in no way been influenced by the
lightness or looseness of the domestic labor market. If allowance is also made
for refugees admitted since 1965 and for the tide of illegal immigrants thCJt
14
have entered over this same period, there is no doubt that immigration in all of
its forms has steadily added substantial numbers of additional workers regard-
less of the cyclical ability of the economy to provide sufficient jobs for
citizen or immigrant workers. This practice is at total variance with the
practice of most of the 'handful of other countries that have been admitting
immigrants over this same period.
Immigrants Have A Higher labor Force Participation Rate
legal immigrants are asked at the time they apply for a visa to specify an
"occupation." The answers to this question have traditionally provided the
source for the scant occupational information that exists for immigrants. David
North and William ~leissert, in the early 1970s, found in a small sample survey
that those adult immigrants who, at the time of entry, specified an "occupation"
did turn out, in fact, to subsequently be in labor force. In other words the
answer to the question tended to be a rough proxy for a labor force partici-
pation rate. Using this procedure they found that, of adult immigrants who
entered the United States in the 1960s, their labor force participation rate was
only fractionally higher than the 59.0 rate for the general population.
More importantly, North and Weissert compared the original data supplied at
the time of entry with registration cards completed by immigrants two years
later. They found a 20 percent increase in the number of persons who indicated
that they had an occupation.12. The additional warkers came largely from the
immediate relatives of legal immigrants who were adult women ~~o had previously
listed themselves as "housewifes" and from some of their children who had
initially listed themselves as "students". To this degree, North and Weissert
contended that the estimates provided by other studies that relied only on labor
15
force information at the time of entry seriously "understated" the real impact
of legal immigrants on the labor market by their failure to allow for these
subsequent labor force entry decisions.
There is no such data, of course, for illegal immigrants but it is in-
tuitively obvious that their labor force participation rates are as high, if
not higher, than those of legal immigrants. Illegal immigrants are primarily
job seekers. These are legislatively ineligible for many of the transfer
programs that might provide alternative income sources. The case with refugees,
however, is not quite so clear." Refugees prior to the 1970s seem to have had a
relatively easier adjustment process to labor force entry than have the large
infusions of refugees from Southeast Asia that have occurred since the mid-
1970s. Refugees have been eligible not only for federal income transfer
programs but also for local and state prog~ams that are available to citizen
programs.
On balance, however, it seems certain that the labor force participation
rate of all immigrants since 1965 is considerably higher than of the labor force
as a whole.
Immigration Supplies Workers Independent of the Macro Human Resource Needs of
the Economy
For the overwhelming proportion of all of those persons who have immigrated
to the United States, they have been admitted without regard to their skill,
education, or geographic settlement preferences. Eighty percent of the persons
who received visas to immigrate are admitted because the immigration system
gives preference to family reunification principles. Immediate relatives of all
immigrants are admitted regardless of their labor force credentials as are u11
refugees and would-be asylees. This is not meant to imply that those \o't)o are
admitted under these procedures lack talents but, rather as Dav id North and
16
Allen LeBel have observed, they "do so accidently.,,13 Accordingly, it is
estimated that only above 5 percent of all those persons admitted to the United
States are required to have labor certifications that indicate that they are
meeting established labor force needs. If illegal immigrants are included of
course, even this small 'percentage of labor certified workers would be reduced
to an infinitesimal number if compared to the total flow of immigrant workers.
The Immigrant Flow is Predominately Composed of Members of Minority Groups
The most important qualitative change in the personal characteristics of
immigrants that has occurred since .the end of the national origins system has
been the complete shift in the regions of origin of the immigrants. Almost 80
percent of the immigrants and refugees admitted during the 1970s were from Latin
America and Asia. In the 1980s, the percentage is closer to 84 percent.
Beginning with the decade of the 1960s, Europe was replaced for the first time
in the nation's history by Latin America as the leading source of immigrants.
By the 1970s, Asia, which was now free from the discriminatory features
of the previous immigration system, was challenging Latin America for that
distinction.
The shift in the source of immigrants can be vividly seen by an examination
of the nations that have become the primary source of immigrants since 1970
(see Table 2). The last time that a European nation was even in this ranking
was in 1973 (when Italy placed. fifth). Mexico has clearly become the country
that supplies the most immigrants and the Philippine Islands have tended to be
the runner-up. The other leading source countries vary from year to year but,
since 1974, they have all been located in either Asia or the Caribbean Basin
area.
The predominance of immigrants from Latin ftroerica and the Caribbean area
can be easily explained in terms of the priority given to family reunfication in
IdlJlt: I.. I fit: I
''''11; \,0".'1,.11""."'....
"''''''
,,,-
"';1"--- ..~-.---
Rank Order of Ir.111igr iource Countri es Percentage of
Total "cco"r.ted
-To~a1 leg~1 For By FI ve
Ycar Iml rat Ion First Second Third Fourth Fifth HI hest Countries
1959 358.579 Co\;n~ry: ~~exi co Italy Philippines Canada Greece 34.9
T,,~~I: 44.623 23,617 20,744 18,582 17,724
Perce'1t: 12.4 6.6 5.8 5.2 4.9
1970 373,326 Countr'Y: !",exico Phil ippines Italy Greece Cuba 35.7
Tot~l: 44.469 31.203 24.973 16.464 16.334
Percent: 11.9 8.4 6.7 4.4 4.4
1971 370.478 Cou'1try: Mexico Philippines Ita1y Cuba Greece 37.3
Tot.1!: 50.103 28.471 22.137 21,511 15.939
Percent: 13.5 7.7 6.0 5.8 4.3
1972 384,635 Cour-try: ~~exIco Ph i 11 ppl nes 1taly Cuba Korea 35.8
Total: 64,G40 29,376 21.427 20,045 18.876
Percer.t: 16.7 7.6 5.6 5.2 4.9
1973 400,063 Cou'ltry: /'lexIco Philippines Cuba Korea lta:y 44.2
Tutal: 70,141 30.799 24,147 22.930 22.151
Percent: 17.5 7.7 b.O !I.7 !I.5
1974 394,861 Country: HexIco Philippines Korea Cuba China-Taiwan 42.9
Total 71.586 32,857 28.028 18.929 18.056
Per'(;~nt: 18.1 8.3 7.1 4.8 4.6
1975 3&6,194 Country: Mexico Philippines Korea Cuba China-Taiwan 43.4
Total: 62,205 32,857 28,362 25,955 18.536
Percent: 16.1 8.5 7.3 6.7 4.11
1976 398,615 Country: Mexico Phl1i ppi nes Korea Cuba Chi na -Ta twan 43.6
TotJI: 57.863 37,281 30,803 29,233 18,823
rer'cent: 1'\.5 9.1 7.7 7.3 4.7
.1976 TQ 103.676 CO'.Jntry: r.exIco Phil ippines Korea Cuba Cht na-Taiwan 42.8Total: 16,001 9,738 6.887 6,763 5,034
Percent: 15.4 9.4 6.6 1i.5 4.9
1977 462,315 Country: Cuba /I,exlco Philivpines Korea China-Taiwan 44.0
TotaI: 69.708 44,079 39,11 30.917 19,764
Percent: 15.1 9.5 8.5 6.7 4.3
1978 601,442 Country: fJ,exlco Vietnam Philippines Cuba Korea 46.0Tota1; 92,3157 88,543 37,216 29,754 29,288
Percent: 15.4 14.7 b.2 4.9 4.9
1979 460,348 Country: Hexlco Philippines China-Taiwan Korea Vietnam 36.8Tola I: 52.0'16 41,300 29,264 24,'248 22,546
rer'cent: 11.3 9.0 6.4 5.3 4.9
'980 530,63g Country: Mexico Vietnam Philippines Korea China-Taiwan 38.2Tota1: 56.680 43,483 42,483 32,320 27,651
Percent: 10.7 8.2 'J.O 6.1 5.2
....
-..J
1981 596,600 N.A. N.A. N.A. M.A- N.A. R.A-
. a TransItional Quarter
.. . ?rojec~ed Est~nate
N.A." ~otAv~I'able
Source: Select Commissionon Immigrationand Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the Nationa1
Interest, Staff Report, SupplelT'.entto the Final Report, Washington, D.C. U.S. Government
Prlntlng Office 1981, pp. 230-1.
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the admissions system. for Asians, the explanation is more complex. It would
seem that the family reunification system should have worked against many Asian
groups, given the exclusionary features that were in effect for much of the
pre-1965 era. The answer to this paradox in the fact that Asians have made
astute. use of the occupational preferences as well as the fact that they have
over~melmingly dominated the massive refugee flows since the mid-1970s.
likewise, the illegal immigrant flows have also been dominated by flows
from Mexico and the Caribbean Area. The best approximations are that about 60
percent of the illegal immigrants to the United States come from Mexico and
about 20 percent come from other countries of the Caribbean area. The remaining
20 percent come from other nations of the world.
Without doubt, therefore, the combined immigrant flows are overwhelmingly
composed of persons from minority groups (Hispanics, blacks, and Asians). As
will be discussed later, there is a strong clustering pattern of immigrants into
local labor markets of the central cities of a few large states that are already
composed 'of persons from similar racial and ethnic backgrounds. As a result, it
is very likely that many immigrants compete directly with other citizen minority
workers for available jobs. The competition is likely to be most severe in
the lower skilled occupations. For the higher skilled legal immigrants, as
indicated earlier, the competition for employment opportunities is more broadly
based.
It is likely therefore, that since 1965 immigration in general -- but
illegal immigration and refugee flows in particular -~ has tended to adversely
effect the employment, and earnings opportunities of minority citizens. To the
degree this has happened, uncontrolled immigration has worked at cross purposes
with other human resources policies that have been initiated over these s~)e
l~
years that have been designed principally to improve the economic opportunity
for these minority citizen groups.
The Occupational Patterns of Immigrants Is Extremely Different From That of the
labor Force As a Whole
With specific reference to the occupational patterns of immigrants, the
occupational distribution of those admitted as legal immigrants is skewed toward
professional, technical, and skilled workers. The pattern is due largely to the
fact that the complex admission system is biased toward those who have family
connections as well as the time and the money that it takes to work their way
through the labyrinth of the legal immigration system. For the minority who are
admitted under the two occupational preferences, they are largely restricted to
those with high skills and/or extensive educational backgrounds. Persons who
are likely to become "public charges" are specifically excluded from becoming
legal immigrants from any nation. Furthermore, because of the extensive backlog
of visa applications (over 1.2 million visa applications were pending at the
end of 1982), there have been no visas available since 1978 for the non-pre-
ference residual category that theoretically exists. Thus, it is not
surprising that the occupational characteristics are skewed differently from the
distribution of the labor force as a whole. Yet, it should also be apparent that
given this occupation distribution, it is likely that legal immigrants do
compete extensively with the citizen labor force for the available jobs in these
white collar and skilled blue collar occupations when they are in the same local
labor market. Thus, even though 80 percent of the legal immigrants are admitted
under family reunification principles, it is a mistake to believe that there are
no labor market consequences that flow frorn their presence.
It appears from studies by David North of a cohort of,1970 immigrants and a
study by Barry Chiswick of the foreign born who entered the U.S. up lo 1970,
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that the earnings of immigrants tends to be initially below those of citizen
workers in comparable occupations but that these differences gradually vanish in
11 to 15 years.14 Moreover, Chiswick found that male immigrants actually end
up doing better than citizen workers in comparable occupations after about 20
years in the country. He was unable to make conclusive findings about female
immigrants. It is of consequence to note that Chiswick found that immigrants
from Mexico and the Philippines (the two countries that have been the largest
sources of legal immigrants since 1965) were the least likely to sustain these
favorable results.
In reviewing, Chiswick's ambitious research on this subject, it is vital to
keep in mind that his analysis is of all foreign-born who had entered the United
States prior to 1970. Since 1970, the full effect of the Immigration Act of
1965 and the Refugee Act of 1980 have occurred. As North has noted, the 1970
.
census data on the foreign-born II is a group composed of persons of above average
age, most of whom ca~e to the U.S. many years earlier and under provisions of
earl ier lE;g isl ation .,,15 As a consequence he.war~s against the use of this
data as a reference group since "one must not assune that the profile of the
foreign-born which emerged from the 1970 Census will be similar to that emerging
from the 1980 or 1990 censuses."16
likewise, the sizeable increases in the number of illegal immigrants --
since the 1960s -- especially those from Mexico and the Caribbean Basin -- have
been dominated by low and unskilled workers which also challenge any complacent
deductions that would seem to be the logical conclusions of some of the existing
literature. In Chiswick's work, for instance, there is no way to separate the
experience of legal immigrants from illegal immigrants since the foreign-born
as reported by the Census are a collective statistical grouping. It is certain
that the illegal immigrant population is severely uildercounled in the Cem;u8
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and, accordingly, it is likely that their experiences are not adequately
captured by this data base.'
One study that has made use of the 1980 Census and its data on the foreign
born was done by Gregory DeFreitas and Adriana Marshall. It found that over
one-third of all immigra~ts were employed in manufacturing (compared to 23
percent of native born workers).17 In many metropolitan areas, the concen-
tration was even more pronounced -- 75 percent of all manufacturing workers in
Miami were immigrants; over 40 percent of those in Los Angeles and New York
City; 25 percent in San Francisco; and 20 percent in Chicago and Boston. In 35
metropolitan areas with a population of more than one million, immigrants
comprised 19 percent of all production jobs in manufacturing. Not surprisingly,
given the occupational, industrial and geographic concentration of the immigrant
work force, the study found that the rate of wage growth in manufacturing was
inversely related to the size of the immigrant population in those metropolitan
areas. The high concentration of foreign born workers had a statistically
significant negative impact on wage growth compared to the experience with large
metropolitan areas with lower percentages of foreign born workers. The study
does have some of the same data problems that confronted Chiswick (i.e., all
forms of immigrants are lumped together, the data is cumulative in that it makes
no distinction for how many years they have been in the country, and illegal
immigrants are likely to be undercounted) but it does have the real advantage of
using 1980 data.
Given that the illegal immigrant flows int~ the labor ~rce since 1965 are
likely to have matched and probably exceeded the legal flows, it is essential
that the labor market experiences of illegal immigrants be specifically included
in any effort to assess the overall impact of immigrants on the labor market.
There are only two studies that have been able to make a serious attempt to
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capture some measure of these patterns. One was a nationwide study made of
apprehended illegal immigrants by David North and Marion Houstoun in 1976.18
The second was a study made of unapprehended illegal immigrants in Los Angeles
in 1979 by a research team from the University of California at Los Angeles
(UCLA) .19 Both studies were funded by the U.S. Department of Labor. In the
North and Houstoun study, the respondents had been in the United States for an
average of 2.5 years while in the UCLA study the mean was 4.0 years.
The occupational patterns of the respondents in the two studies are shown
in Table 3. Clearly, the illegal immigrants are concentrated in the unskilled
occupations of farm workers, service workers, non-farm laborers as well as the
semi-skilled blue collar occupations of operatives. A significant number are
also in the skilled blue collar occupation of craft workers. few were found i~
any white collar occupation.
A comparison of the data in Table 3 with the employment patterns of the
nations black and Mexican origin workers will show that workers from these
groups are employed disproportionately in exactly the same occupations as are
most illegal immigrants in the cited studies. The employment pattern of Mexican
origin workers, in fact, better resembles the pattern of illegal immigrants than
it does the general distribution pattern of the nation's labor force.
It seems certain that the illegal immigrant workers are concentrated in the
secondary labor market of the U.S. economy where they often compete with the
millions of citizen workers who also work and seek-work in this sector.
Indeed, Malcolm Lovell, the Under Secretary of Labor in his testimony to
Congress in support of immigration reform, stated that" in 1981, close to 30
percent of all workers employed in lhis country, some 29 million people, were
holding down the same kind 0 flow-skilled industr ial, serv ice, and farm jobs in
which illegals lypically find employment .,,20
los Angcles Community Study
.
1972-19758
Detention Site
Study, 1974-5A Previously Never
. All Apprehended App,'ehendcd Apprehendcd
Aliens Total ' Aliens Aliens.
~lhite Co 11 a 1': 5.4 10.5 6.6 12.1
Professional
and Technical 1.6 4.3 2.7 5.0
Managers and
Admini s tra tors 1.3 0.7 .8 .7
Sa 1es\'/orkers 1.1 1.9 .8 2.3
Clerical 1.4 3.6 2.3 4.1
Blue Collar: 55.2 73.0 79.0 70.4
Craft \~orkers 15.3 28.8 . 32.8 27.1
, Operatives 25.1 31.8 31.1 32.1
Non- Fa nn
laborers 14.8' 12.4 15.1 11.2
'.
Service Horkers 20.6 16.1 14.2 16.9
Farm \~orkers 18.8 .4 .2 .5
Tota 1 Percen t 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table 3. . ErTiploymcnt Patterns of Illcgal Irrmigrants from 1\'/0 Rcsearch
Studies Prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor.
.'
Sources: AOavid S. North and Marion F. Houstoun, The Characteristics and ~ole
of J11(>9..<:1..1Aliens in the U.S. La,bol' f-\:'!!:,kp.t: An Ext)'lorJtory Stud~~:---
Washington, D.C., Linton & Company, 1976, p. 104.
.
'.
B~taurice 'D. Van Andol Jr., Joan ~loore, Oavid Hee,', Susan P. Htlyni'c',
~on.:A2.Ei~~,!ded and }\l~l.:.ehend~_~__L~documente_cLBcsi den t_~r.!.._the l_o_~,
Anqclc$ Lobor' t';,1rket. Final Draft submitted to the U.S. De~Jrtn~nt
o(lab-orunder Research Contract No. 20-06-77-16, (t-\ay, 1979), p. 65.
that legal immigrants are highly concentrated into a relatively few major labor
markets. Since 1966, California and New York have consistently accounted fur
about 46 percent of the intended residences of all legal immigrants. Texas,
Florida, New Jersey and Illinois account for about 2S percent of the remainder.
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Illegal immigrants are by no means the only cause of unemployment and
persistent low income patterns among certain sub-groups of the American labor
force but they certainly are
~
factor. The formulation of any serious full
employment strategy for the United States in the 1980s, therefore, will have to
include measures to curtail illegal immigration.
Thus, it would appear that the occupational impact of legal immigrants is at
the upper end of the nations occupational structure while the impact of illegal
immigrants is at the lower end. Studies that combine these two groups to obtain
an average measure of the experience of immigrants on the labor force (e.g.,
those that use the data for the foreign born population) miss the significance
of the real impact. The important point is that in both segments of the labor
force there is competition with citizen workers and in both cases there is no
guidance provided by the extant immigration system.
The Locational Impact of Immigrants Is Extremely Unequal
One of the most pronounced effects of the unguided immigration system is
Thus, six states have received almost three-quarters of all of the legal
immigrants. Data from the 1980 Census also confirm this high concentration rate
of the total foreign born population in the same states (the percentageof
~reign born in California was 14.8 percent, Ne~ York 13.4 percent, New Jersey
10.3, Florida 10.9, Illinois 7.3 and Texas 6.0).21
Within the states in which they settle, legal immigrants have demonstrated
a consistent preference in the 19705 for the large central cities.22 Althou)h
the exact percentages varies each year, a central city was the destinationof
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about 55 percent of the immigrants who were admitted between 1960 and 1979.
Urban areas -- those with a population of between 2,500 to 99,000 people -- were
lhe clear second choices while rural areas were a distant last. These initial
residential patterns differ distinctly from those of the general population in
which urban areas have become the overwhelming first choice since 1960 (ac-
counting for almost half of the population) followed by an almost equal pre-
ference (of about 25 percent each) for central cities and rural areas.
The Census information on the foreign-born population in 1980 vividly
demonstrates the effect that immigration is having on the population of a few
large metropolitan areas. In 1980, for instance, the metropolitan area with the
highest percentage of its population being foreign-born was Hiami, florida with
a phenomenal percentage of 35.2 percent. The second highest was Los Angeles,
California (21.6 percent) and the third was New York City (20.8 percent). Thus,
the necessity to accommodate the growing immigrant flow has not fallen evenly.
Only a few states and a handful of cities have borne the brunt of the revival of
immigration that has occurred since 1965. It is also of consequence to note
that the settlement pattern of illegal immigrants has close~y resembled the
locational preferences of legal immigrants. In their quest to avoid detection,
illegal immigrants often seek to blend into communities that already have large
numbers of persons from similar ethnic backgrounds. This tendency, of course,
only intensifies the pressures on these few states and cities to accommodate
immigrants.
Thus, the uneven distribution of immigrants means that studies that focus
on the national level and ~lich use aggregate labor force data mi.ss the actual
impact of immigration. The labor forces in many states and localities are
largely unaffected by this phenomenon. But when one recognizes that those
states (and those central cities in these states) which are forced to
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accomodate to massive immigration account for a significant portion of the
total employment in the nation, there is no reason to consider these impacts as
inconsequential to the economy as a whole.
In The Short Run, It is likely That Immigrants Contribute to Higher
Unemployment Rates
Although the available research is very limited, Chiswick has found for the
foreign born males that it takes about five years for them to reach the same
number of weeks worked and to come down to the same number of weeks of unemploy-
ment as native born men.23 This would suggest that,in the short run, immi-
grant males tend to experience a higher incidence of unemployment than is the
general case. In his findings, it is also of importance to note that he also
found that the foreign born males from Mexico, Cuba, and China tended to take
longer to reach parity with native born men than it did the foreign born men
from other nations. As indicated earlier in Table 2, all three of these
countries have consistently ranked among the largest sources of legal immigrants
and refugees since 1970. Again, it is important to keep in mind all of the
aforementioned limitations of the Chiswick analYBis -- especially the fact that
his work is based largely on the experiences of the foreign born prior to the
1970s. It is logical to conclude that, if anything, the experiences of the
past decade should be less favorable than those that occurred prior to the
1970s.
Concluding Observations
The prevailing immigration policy of the United States was largely con-
ceived in the early 1950s and the mid-1960s when immigration was not a par-
ticularly significant influence on the economy of the nation. As a consequence,
the current immigration policy manifests a complete disint~rest in its labor
force implications. Perhaps the nation could continue to allow immiqration
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policy to be excluded from any responsibility to contribute directly to nation's
economic welfare if the economy had not undergone significant changes and if the
immigration flows of workers had remained relatively small. But this has not
been the case. Hence, the "practice" of allowing immigration policy to continue
to follow its own nepotistic, inflexible, mechanistic, and massively abused
course is a "luxury" that this nation can ill afford to continue.
The contemporary economy of the United states is a far cry from the one
into which earlier waves of immigrants entered. The resurgence of immigration
since 1965 has exactly parallelled the period when the labor force of the United
States has sustained unprecedented changes in both size and composition.
With regard to size, the civilian labor force increased by an average of
1.8 million workers each year from 1964 to 1973; and annually by 2.2 million
from 1973 to 1980. Since then the rate of annual increase -- as officially
measured (which means that it is doubtful if the full effects of growing numbers
of illegal immigrants are included) -- has declined slightly. Nonetheless, in
1984 the Bureau of labor Statistics (BLS) announced that it is revising its long
term projections of labor force growth from the period 1982 to 1990 to 1.6
million net new trorkers each year. (I would argue that even this is likely to
be conservative -- as all similar projections by BLS in the past have been).
As for the composition of the labor force, the period since 1965 has been
a one in which racial and ethnic groups as well as women have dramatically
increased their proportions of the total labor force. The BLS projects that
these patterns will continue -- with women accounting for two-thirds 0 f the
annual growth in the labor force and blacks about 25 percent over the next
decade. It is certain -- especially if immigration continues the pattern of the
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past -- that the Hispanic labor force will also increase its share dispro-
portionately even though the BLS did not highlight this group in its projec-
tions.
With respect to the entire labor force, the next decade presents the nation
with a unique situation. Because the "baby boom" generation has now come of
age, it is projected that by 1990 the largest single age cohort of the popula-
tion will be between the ages of 25 to 44 -- the prime working age years. It is
B period when labor force participation is at its highest for both males and
females. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is predicted that there will
be more persons in the labor force than not -- including babies. By 1995, it is
expected that 70 percent of the labor force will be between 25 and 54 years of
age. Thus, it is going to be a period in which there will be mounting pressure
on the economy to generate additional employment opportunities -- especially for
women and minorities.
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the last two decades of the
Twentieth Century are going to be years in which. the labor force of the nation
will be confronted with immense pressures to accommodate both the growth in the
number of jobs seekers as well as to changes in the composition of the suppply
of labor. The quest to meet these challenges will be difficult enough without
being undermined by an immigration policy that is seemingly oblivious to its
labor market impacts but which~ in actuality, ha~ influential labor market
consequences.
The broad outlines of the policy reform needed to make immigration policy
conform to the economic welfare a f the nation are easy to list. With respect to
the annual levels of immigration, there need to be enforceable ceilings.
But they should be ceilings and not inflexible numbers. Jhe actual nunber of
immigrants admitted should he responsive to unemployment trends in
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the nat io"n. Annual immigration levels should fluctuate inversely with unernploy-
ment trends. The system should be capable of responding to changing economic
circumstances. The boundary ceiling should be set by legislation but the
precise levels in any given year should be set administratively. It is impl ic it
if this were to be done, that the administrative responsibilities for immi-
gration policy should be shifted back to the U.S. Department of labor (or some
other new agency that might be created to administer and coordinate all of the
nation's human resource development policies) and away from the judiciary
committees of Congress. likewise, this agency should have complete control over
the circumstances in which non-immigrant temporary workers are admitted to work
in the United States.
As regard to the actual determination of Hho is admitted as a legal
immigrant each year the preference system should revert back to the primary
emphasis on occupational preferences that characterized the preference system
from 1952 to 1965. (It should be recalled that such a change "uuld not affect
the status of immediate family members as they a~e not counted). Family
reunification should remain an admission criterion but not the primary factor as
has been the case since 1965. No other nation in the war ld allows such a
nepotistic and discriminatory doctrine to dominate its admission system. The
occupational preferences should be increased to at least the pre-1965 level of
50 percent of the available visas. In adddition, the occupational categories
should be changed to allow the entire range of skill levels (i.e., unskilled,
semi-skilled for skilled) to be admitted with full discretion given to the
administrative agency to decide which occupations are in greatest need at any
part icular time. Included within this discretionary power should be the right
to give preference to immigrants willing to settle in regions where labor is
scarce. The shift 8\vay from the dominance of fanily rcuJ)ifil'Ht ion \>,QuId 81:";0
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allow opportunities for "new seed immigrants" (especially for immigrants from
Africa ~1ich have the most trouble competing under the existing system) to
enter.
The refugee and asylee policies of the nation are the most difficult to
integrate into a policy ~esign that focuses on economic priorities. Obviously,
the United states should continue to participate in the world wide effort to
absorb and to assist in the accommodation of refugees. But experience clearly
indicates that there must be some limitations on the number of refugees that are
to be admitted and where they are to be settled. A legislative ceiling should
be set on the number of refugees to be admitted with the understanding that, if
special circumstances do arise, more refugees may be admitted but that offset-
ting reductions will be made in the number of legal immigrants in the same or
the following year. If a situation should develop that was truly extraordinary,
Congress could legislate a temporary increase in the numerical boundaries to
accommodate such a unique circumstance. The asylee issue is presently too
complex to discuss in this paper except to note that the current policy is
hopelessly bogged down in a system of judicial paralysis. It is essential that
a more expedited system of reaching closure in these cases be designed. But the
ultimate principle for admission should be the same as refugees: namely, if
asylee permissions are granted, legal immigration should be reduced accordingly.
It is essential that the princ~ple of choice be firmly established in the
operation of the nation's immigration system. Otherwise, one is confronted with
the chaos of the present system where the policy is essentially one that
ratifies what has already happened anyway. Moreover, there is no sense estab-
lishing the concept that total immigrant flo~3 should fluctuate with domestic
labor market conditions if lhe enlire process can be circumvented by flows from
another source. There are already ~1ple signs that the refugee and asylee
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system is being used for purpose other than thane for which it was designed --
to avoid persecution for one's political and personal views. The full cost of
assisting re fugees and asylees to be prepared for entry into the labor market
should be borne by the federal government.
All of the preceding suggestions, of course, are predicated on the assump-
tion that a full-scale effort will be mounted to end the flow of illegal
immigrants into the country. It would make no sense at all to attempt to
construct a positive immigration policy that works in tandum with general
economic policy if the entire process can be easily circumvented. The appro-
priate policies should be designed to address both the "push" and the "pull"
factors that contribute to the illegal immigration process. They should include
enhanced deterrent policies (e.g., employer sanctions, increased INS funding,
and less reliance on the use of the voluntary departure system) as well as
prevention measures (e.g., extensive economic and technical development as-
sistance, trade and tariff concessions, and the absolute insistance on the
adherence to human rights principles and the protection of human life from
murder and torture as a prerequisite for receipt of the economic aid and trade
concessions).
The absence of any serious effort to forge an immigration policy based upon
labor market considerations means that immigration policy today functions as a
"wild card" among the nation's array of key labor market policies. Unlike dl1
other elements of economic policy (e.g., fiscal policy, monetary policy,
employment and training policy, education policy, and anti-discrimination
policy) where attempts are made by policymakers to orchestrate the diverse
policy elements into a harmony of action to accomplish particular objectives,
immigration policy has been allowed to meander aimlessly. This is a situation
that no sensible nation can allow to continup..
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